

**DATE** 17

DESIGN, AUTOMATION & TEST IN EUROPE

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The European Event for Electronic  
System Design & Test

# Security in the Internet of Things: A Challenge of Scale

**Patrick Schaumont**

**Bradley Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering**



# Internet of Things


Virtual



real time



alert



stats




social

Internet

Real

Medical IWMD



Gateway

Mobile



Cloud



# Internet of Things


Virtual



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
social

Bits  
Trust

Internet

Real

Medical IWMD



Gateway

Mobile




Cloud



Physics  
Truth


# Internet of Things



# Security Services

## Four essential security services

- Access Authorization
- Key Exchange
- Data Confidentiality
- Data Authentication



# Standard Crypto Algorithms

	<u><i>Symmetric Key</i></u>		<u><i>Public Key</i></u>	
	Symmetric Encryption	Message Authentication	Signatures	Diffie Hellman
Confidentiality	✓			
Authentication		✓	✓	
Key Exchange	✓ (PSK)			✓
Standard Crypto	<b>AES-128</b>	<b>SHA2, SHA3</b>	<b>ECC, RSA</b>	<b>ECDH, DH</b>


# How to build Crypto for *Things*?

Medical IWMD

Gateway

Mobile

Cloud




**“Things” Crypto**

?

**“Standard” Crypto**

AES-128  
SHA2, SHA3  
ECC, RSA,  
ECDH, DH




# How to build Crypto for *Things*?

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Long Lifetime

Low Footprint


Low Latency

Low Energy

New Attack Models

“Things” Crypto

?



“Standard” Crypto

AES-128

SHA2, SHA3

ECC, RSA,

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


# What is *secure* Information Security?

- **Brute Force Security**



- **Computational Security**



- **Implementation Security**



Brute Force Security implied through key-length under **Von Neumann** computing

Primitive	Symmetric Encryption	Message Authentication	Signatures	Diffie Hellman
Algorithm	AES-128	SHA2, SHA3	ECC, RSA	ECDH, DH

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However ..

Increased Computational Cost

Post Quantum

AES-256	SHA-512 SHA3-512
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# Brute Force Security

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New Algorithm

Post Quantum

AES-256	SHA-512 SHA3-512	Lattice Based Hash Based Code Based	Lattice Based
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Current algorithms trusted, but **IoT constraints** require innovation

Primitive	Symmetric Encryption	Message Authentication	Signatures	Diffie Hellman
Algorithm	AES-128	SHA2, SHA3	ECC, RSA	ECDH, DH

**Lightweight Cryptography: Jointly Optimize {Security, Performance, Area}**

Current algorithms trusted, but IoT constraints require innovation

Primitive	Symmetric Encryption	Message Authentication	Signatures	Diffie Hellman
Algorithm	AES-128	SHA2, SHA3	ECC, RSA	ECDH, DH

## Published Proposals since 2005

**Lightweight  
Cryptography**

21 Block  
4 Stream

8 Hash  
5 Auth Enc

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**Lightweight  
Cryptography**

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
21 Block 4 Stream	8 Hash 5 Auth Enc	?	?
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Hardly any choice ?

# Public-Key Crypto in Constrained Environment

## Authentication Protocol

- MSP430 (10 MHz)
- CC2500 RF







# Public-Key Crypto in Constrained Environment

## Authentication Protocol


- MSP430 (10 MHz)
- CC2500 RF



# Precomputed Security





# Precomputed Security





	<b>Data-independent</b>	<b>Cryptographic State</b>	<b>Data-dependent</b>	
AES	Roundkey Exp		Encryption	
DTLS	½ DH Key Exchange		½ DH Key Exchange	
ECDSA	Point Mult		Mod Mul	
TRNG	Entropy Harvesting			

# EH Operation *without* precomputing



# EH Operation *with* precomputing




# Energy-Driven Computing


## Authentication Protocol

- MSP430 (10 MHz)
- CC2500 RF

**Energy Reduction: 11.8X**  
**Latency Improvement: 10.1X**



# Implementation Security




I/O Attacker Model



Better Software

# Implementation Security

Brute Force Security  
Computational Security  
Implementation Security



**I/O Attacker Model**

**Machine Code  
Attacker Model**




**Better Software**

**Secure Architecture  
Isolation**



# Implementation Security

Brute Force Security  
Computational Security  
Implementation Security



**I/O Attacker Model**

**Machine Code  
Attacker Model**

**Hardware Attacker Model**




**Better Software**

**Secure Architecture  
Isolation**

**? Composable ?  
Countermeasures**

# Example – Side-channels

## Software



## Secret S is used in


Memory Lookup

Control Flow Decision

Computation

# Example – Side-channels


## Software



**Secret S is used in**

Memory Lookup  
Control Flow Decision  
Computation

## Architecture




**Secret S may cause**

Cache Timing  
Instruction Timing  
I/O Timing

# Example – Side-channels


## Software



**Secret S is used in**

Memory Lookup  
Control Flow Decision  
Computation


## Architecture



**Secret S may cause**

Cache Timing  
Instruction Timing  
I/O Timing

## Circuit



**Secret S may cause**

EM Side-channel  
Power Side-channel  
Fault-based Side-Channel

# Conclusions

- **IoT Security builds on comprehensive solutions for**
  - **Brute-force Security**
  - **Computational Security**
  - **Implementation Security**
- **Plenty of *hard* problems remain**
  - **Public-key cryptography in Energy/resource-constrained context**
  - **Composable Countermeasures (Timing, Power, Faults, ..)**
  - **Design Correctness, Implementation Correctness, Operation Correctness**

# Thank you for your attention!

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